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ABSTRACT 
 Clandestine methamphetamine laboratories pose a unique threat to law 
enforcement personnel.  The overall level of safety that can be achieved will be 
determined by how law enforcement agencies train and equip their personnel.  
Coordinating the training, procuring protective equipment, and maintaining accurate 
records is a function that should be coordinated at a single point to ensure officer safety 
and accountability to the highest standards.  Information and opinions contained in this 
document were collected from a variety of literary sources, survey results and the 
author’s personal experience as both a narcotics detective and a clan-lab supervisor 
over the past 13 years.  As evidenced in this project, there remains a wide gap in the 
abilities of law enforcement agencies to respond to an illicit drug lab.  Some 
departments defer to state or federal agencies, or do nothing, while other departments 
are quite proactive with respect to training, equipment and records management.  
Additionally, with the rise in “White Powder” and “WMD” calls, law enforcement 
agencies are assigning their Clandestine Laboratory Response Teams to respond to 
incidents involving potential biological hazards or weapons of mass destruction, thus 
increasing the threat to officers and the public.  When a department has a person 
dedicated solely to coordinating training and managing records and equipment, the 
agency will be in a better position to prevent injuries to officers and the general public, 
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 Law enforcement officers who respond to clandestine methamphetamine 
laboratories tend to be ill prepared for the threats posed by the differing hazardous 
materials and toxic conditions encountered at illicit drug lab sites.  Hargreaves (2000) 
wrote, “Police officers receive comprehensive training in many areas of law 
enforcement.  However, very few officers have expertise in firefighting, chemistry, bomb 
handling techniques, and hazardous waste disposal.  Unfortunately, illegal drug 
laboratories pose deadly threats in all of these areas”.  In the Central Texas area, law 
enforcement responses to clandestine labs are generally a collection of officers from 
different agencies with varying levels of experience.  The experience and training levels 
of responding officers range from advanced to none at all.  The problems associated 
with this disparate training and experience is exacerbated by site-safety officers who fail 
to ensure their personnel have received proper training along with adequate personal 
protective equipment (PPE) before entering a contaminated environment.  Additionally, 
a thorough record of employee exposures must be maintained for the protection of 
employees who may, in future years, suffer illnesses from the delayed effects of 
exposure to toxic substances.  The question of whether a law enforcement agency 
should have a clandestine laboratory coordinator position to ensure consistent levels of 
training and program administration will be examined in this research paper.   
In 2001 law enforcement agencies responded to over 12,000 illegal drug labs 
nationwide (Network Environmental Services, 2003).  This research paper will illustrate 
how the policies and procedures governing response, record retention, medical 
evaluations, training, and protective equipment provided to law enforcement personnel 
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assigned to a Clandestine Laboratory Response Team (CLRT) should be consistent 
from agency to agency.  The intended outcome of this research paper is to present 
information to justify a full-time employee (FTE) position for the law enforcement 
agency.  
Methods of inquiry to explore this subject will include the review of publications 
related to clandestine laboratory mitigation, research of Austin Police Department 
incident files and injury/exposure rates.  Additionally, surveys of other Texas law 
enforcement agency’s policies and procedures were conducted to determine 
compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) standards and procedures.  The data 
gathered will be analyzed in a descriptive manner. 
Based upon the findings of this research, information will be presented to 
examine the necessity for an agency to create the position of a full-time CLRT 
Coordinator and consider how the position can be a long-term cost savings tool.  The 
creation of a CLRT Coordinator position could be an effective way for law enforcement 
agencies to reduce work-related accidents and offset the potential for civil liability from 
both the injured employee and innocent citizens exposed to hazardous wastes and toxic 
conditions due to improper lab-site mitigation.   
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Applicable literature on the subject of clandestine laboratory response is 
generally the same with regard to the fact that methamphetamine production techniques 
can be extremely dangerous.  Since the 1980’s illicit methamphetamine manufacturing 
has evolved from the “Biker Method” to a more refined process that is more efficient and 
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yields a better product.  The aptly named biker method was popular during the 1960’s 
and 1970’s.  This method was associated with outlaw motorcycle gangs who set up 
laboratories in rural areas to prevent detection by law enforcement because of the 
distinctive chemical odors produced during the manufacturing process.  Biker labs were 
usually discovered after an explosion or fire causing firefighters, and police, to respond.  
Biker labs commonly used phenyl-2-propanone (P2P) as the precursor and ether as the 
cleansing agent.  A cleansing agent is a compound used to separate, or “wash” the 
methamphetamine from the precursor chemicals and isolate the finished product so it 
can be harvested after it dries.  Ether was a preferred cleansing agent as it evaporates 
very quickly when heated and leaves little residue for a hydrocarbon based compound.  
Unfortunately ether has an extremely low flash-point making it quite explosive in nature.  
During the drying phase, the methamphetamine slurry would be suspended in ether and 
direct heat applied to the container.  The ether would evaporate leaving the finished 
methamphetamine caked in the container.  Over time the evaporating ether fumes 
would saturate the walls of the structure where the lab was being operated.  The more 
unfortunate methamphetamine cook would immolate himself after overheating the 
drying slurry or by simply lighting a cigarette, causing the fumes to ignite.  The resulting 
explosion and fire would be catastrophic because the structure itself was saturated with 
ether.  As stated earlier, methamphetamine manufacturing has evolved.  
”Ephedrine/pseudoephedrine is now the most common precursor used in 
methamphetamine production in the United States. The process involves the reduction 
of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with hydriodic acid and red phosphorous or a metal, 
usually lithium or sodium in anhydrous ammonia” (USDoJ, 2003, p. 2).  The Birch 
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method, also known as the Nazi method, uses anhydrous ammonia along with lithium 
metal.  Lithium metal is easily obtained from household batteries.  The USDoJ (2003) 
further advises, “This method accounts for the majority of laboratory operators in the 
U.S.  The method is relatively simple and less time consuming than the other 
ephedrine/pseudoephedrine methods.  Each production cycle is about 30 
 minutes” (p. 2).  Solvents such as acetone, lighter fluid, camp stove fuel and toluene 
are still commonly used as cleansing agents.  Even though flammable solvents are still 
used in illicit labs, reports of fires are sporadic in the central Texas area.  However, 
these labs can be very toxic.  During the reduction phase, when red phosphorus is 
heated in the presence of acids, it off-gasses phosphine vapors which are fatal in low 
doses.  Burgess (2001) noted the American Conference of Governmental Hygienists 
established the [phosphine] threshold exposure limit as 0.3 ppm.  Phosphine levels 
higher than the threshold limit will still be odorless and an officer might be exposed for 
long periods of time without knowing it.  Knowledge of air-monitors and the use of a self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) are crucial for the health and safety of the CLRT 
member.  Hargreaves (2000) also advises officers should beware of sodium metals as 
they may ignite when in contact with water while anhydrous ammonia can be a deadly 
respiratory hazard.  Common household chemicals are easily converted to use as 
precursor chemicals, which has precipitated the sharp increase of illicit clandestine 
laboratories.  Further, these methods are more efficient by yielding more finished 
product in proportion to precursors, reagents and solvents used.  It appears the primary 
danger to law enforcement is not necessarily fire or explosion but rather toxic gasses 
and substances that can be inhaled or easily absorbed through the skin.  In addition to 
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those external threats, heat exhaustion, dehydration and injuries resulting from falls are 
a significant threat to the officer.  A review of APD’s exposure and injury reports show 
three reported instances of dehydration and/or heat stress.  These are the only injuries 
associated with the CLRT as reported since 2001.  Heat stress and dehydration 
commonly occur after prolonged periods in a Tyvek® protective suit.  The body’s 
internal core temperature can rise to dangerous levels within minutes of sealing the 
protective suit.  Site-safety procedures observed by the Austin Police Department CLRT 
call for time in a Tyvek® suit to last no longer than twenty minutes whereupon the suit 
will be removed and the officers vital signs recorded by medical personnel.  The vital 
signs are then compared to base-line statistics recorded prior to the officer donning the 
protective suit.  Any significant deviation in vital signs will result in a period of 
observation by medical personnel.  Injuries from falls can occur as a result of wearing 
the personal protective equipment.  Limited visibility due to air-masks and filters along 
with limited mobility due to the air-tanks may cause an officer to trip over unseen 
hazards or knock something over with the large air-tank strapped to their back.  In 
Austin, there is an obvious relationship between the low instances of employee injury 
and the qualifications of the CLRT supervisor operating as both the unit’s coordinator 
and as the site-safety officer. Additionally the training proficiencies of everyone 
assigned to the unit is an important factor to consider.  As stated in the USDoJ (2003) 
information brief, “Precursor chemicals, reagents, solvents, and waste products found at 
methamphetamine laboratories and dumpsites pose risks to the long term health of 
those exposed to them.  These chemicals have already been implicated in disabilities 
among law enforcement officers” (p. 1).  Emergency response teams are in danger of 
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exposure to such life threatening toxic chemicals as anhydrous ammonia, lithium 
metals, sodium metals, hydrogen chloride gas and phosphine vapors.     
Those officers chosen for service on a Clandestine Laboratory Response team 
need extensive training in hazardous materials and how to handle them.  The Drug 
Enforcement Agency offers a week-long training program for state and local officers on 
how to mitigate an illicit lab.  Unfortunately the DEA can only accept so many trainees 
each year resulting in a few officers trying to pass along training and techniques to their 
co-workers.  Their intentions may be good and genuine but unfortunately, bad habits 
are usually what get passed along by those who are not certified to teach a complicated 
subject.  This problem is further exacerbated by the absence of a site-safety officer or 
one who is inadequately trained.  Site-safety is also a training regimen provided by the 
DEA.  The DEA site-safety officer training program will certify the officer as required by 
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).  Even though Texas 
is not an OSHA mandated state, the OSHA regulations regarding clandestine laboratory 
safety are good procedures to follow.  Having a certified full time coordinator who is well 
versed in OSHA standards, and has the authority to enforce the standards, might very 
well reduce a Departments exposure with regard to injured employees or citizens and 
the civil lawsuits that usually follow industrial accidents.  Conners (1989) wrote, “Police 
agencies can face civil liability for inadequate training, improper handling and storage of 
chemical waste, and negligent decontamination procedures”.  The federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality (TCEQ) have regulations that a department must observe when reporting 
contaminated properties and with regards to the disposal of hazardous wastes.  If toxic 
7 
substances have been illegally dumped, it is the responding agency’s responsibility to 
secure the site and make the proper notifications.  Proper notifications allow these 
agencies to expedite environmental protections especially when ground water may 
become contaminated or if innocent citizens will be exposed to toxic substances.  Only 
certified hazardous waste disposal contractors may be used to collect and dispose of 
hazardous wastes and then transport those wastes on public roads.  A CLRT 
coordinator would know which disposal company is currently on contract with the DEA.  
Occasionally the disposal contractor must come from a great distance.  The disposal 
company once contracted for the Austin area was located in Oklahoma City resulting in 
an 8-hour response time.  A department’s CLRT coordinator would be able coordinate 
the logistics of securing the area with on-duty or overtime patrol officers from the 
surrounding districts or jurisdictions. 
Pre-assignment medical evaluations are a must for personnel assigned to a 
CLRT.  A medical base-line should be established to document the employee’s overall 
health with a focus on cardiovascular and respiratory functions.  Occasionally a 
potential team member will be diagnosed with a pre-existing condition that might 
otherwise make them an unsuitable candidate.  The medical records associated with 
employees must be secured and guarded from prying eyes.  The custody of these 
records can be maintained by the agency physician or the CLRT coordinator.  
Additionally, exposure reports must be filled out each and every time a lab is raided 
irregardless if there was an exposure or not.  These governmental records are 
mandated to be retained for a period of no less than 30 years.  A department would be 
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well advised to have a mechanism in place to keep these records organized and 
securely stored. 
Any CLRT will need to keep and maintain a host of specialized equipment that 
must be ready to use at a moments notice.  Lives might be lost if the working condition 
of specialized personal protective equipment is not scrupulously maintained.  As an 
example, According to 29 CFR 1910.134 (OSHA standards) before an employee may 
wear an air-purifying respirator, the employer must establish a record of the annual 
qualitative and quantitative fit tests administered to an employee (as cited in U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 2000, section (m) Recordkeeping).  Also, the air-purifying 
respirator must be re-certified annually along with any air tanks and associated gear 
such as regulators and hoses.  The purchasing of Tyvek® suits and air purifying 
respirator filters can be an ordeal itself.  Exactly which suits and filters to use is 
dependant on the type of contamination that may be found in an illicit laboratory.  The 
coordinator would be in a position to have a working knowledge of the protective gear’s 
capabilities.  One would not wear a suit with an exposed stitched seam into an 
environment where liquid contaminants are present that could soak through the seam.  
In the same vein, one would not wear latex gloves when solvents are present that will 
make the gloves melt. 
METHODOLGY 
 
The accepted methods or standard operating procedures on how an agency 
responds to an illicit drug laboratory directly relates to the question which considers 
whether or not a law enforcement agency should have a full-time employee identified as 
a Clandestine Laboratory Coordinator.  The literature reviewed ranged from medical 
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journals, industry trade journals, governmental reports to private medical reports and 
conversations.  Based upon the author’s readings, surveys and interactions with officers 
from numerous departments, both large and small, the answer to that question is an 
easy “yes”.  However, once the factors of budget and personnel limitations get thrown 
into the mix, the answer is no longer quite so easy.  An agency with a CLRT coordinator 
would be ahead of the bureaucratic curve, so-to-speak, by having someone in-place to 
facilitate all of the agency’s needs with regards to staffing, training, and equipment.  
Being proactive by creating a position to coordinate all of the associated tasks related to 
mitigating illicit drug labs will give the chief or sheriff the ability to create or expand 
accountability in an area where there is traditionally little oversight.  Further, one need 
only compare the cost of one sizable civil-suit award to the cost of one employee.       
In addition to literary research and personal experiences; a questionnaire was 
constructed and distributed to representatives of 18 local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies; resulting in a 100% response rate.  Those persons responding 
to the questionnaire were generally in positions of authority and had direct input into the 
decision making processes at their respective agencies.  Additionally, the author’s 
personal experience as a narcotics detective and supervisor during the past 13 years 
weighed heavily in the creation of this document.      
FINDINGS 
 
Most agree that clan lab sites are dangerous places and extreme care must be 
taken by everyone involved in the clean-up process.  The type and scope of chemical 
and physical hazards officers can be exposed to are extremely diverse.  Officer 
exposure to hazards associated with illicit drug laboratories severely rivals traditional 
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law enforcement hazards.  The diversity of hazards poses special problems related to 
appropriate recognition and control.  The most obvious hazard identified may not be the 
most serious in terms of route or duration of exposure, target effects, the ability to 
control or interaction with other hazards.  The glaring chemical exposure hazards 
associated with opening a container of unknown material may overshadow the equally 
important recognition of flammability and explosion hazards associated with the same 
activity.  In addition, taking the necessary steps to control the chemical exposure hazard 
(i.e., use of protective clothing and equipment) may create a hazard more serious than 
the targeted chemical hazard.  Because controlling one hazard may create, or impede 
control of other hazards.  Careful recognition and evaluation of hazards is necessary to 
develop, prioritize and implement hazard control measures (Austin Police Department, 
2001, Section 1 Hazard Recognition and Evaluation).  Although the potential hazards 
associated with field activities are numerous, all are thoroughly documented in current 
literature.  Many hazards identified with clandestine laboratories are nearly identical to 
similar hazards commonly found in the home and workplace.  In addition, other hazards 
specifically related to waste handling tasks at laboratories are substantially similar to 
hazardous waste handling activities performed by numerous agencies and contractors 
for abandoned waste sites and chemical emergency response.  Although clandestine 
drug laboratory field activities pose a unique set of health and safety problems, 
knowledge of hazards (and control measures) is of concern to law enforcement agency 
personnel, specifically, the designated site-safety officer who must manage the 
departments’ response to current and future laboratories.  Adverse health effects in law 
enforcement personnel investigating clandestine labs have been reported, even in 
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individuals wearing respiratory protection.  The most common symptoms included 
headache and respiratory, mucous membrane, and skin irritation (Burgess, 2001).  
Responding to labs actively manufacturing drugs was also found to be a risk factor for 
acute symptoms.  The most common inhalation exposures were considered to be from 
acid gasses and solvents (Burgess, 1996).  The process used to manufacture 
methamphetamine varies from lab to lab.  One of the most common methods uses red 
phosphorus, hydriodic acid, and pseudoephedrine.  If the red phosphorous is over-
heated during the reduction process it may produce phosphine gas.  According to 
Willers-Russo (2000), “Within law enforcement there are anecdotal reports of 
occupational phosphine exposure. Three deaths reported in methamphetamine cooks 
were considered secondary to phosphine exposure, although actual exposure 
concentrations could not be documented” (as cited in Dekkar, 2001).  Exposure to 
phosphine gas may go unnoticed since it has a very low or unnoticeable odor.  
Individuals may be exposed for relatively long periods without knowing it.  The American 
Conference of Governmental Hygienists has established a threshold limit of 0.3 parts 
per million (ppm) and a short-term (15 minute) exposure limit of 1 ppm for phosphine 
(2000).  Therefore it is critical for an agency to possess or have access to air-monitoring 
equipment to detect lethal vapors and gasses.  If an agency cannot afford these 
devices, relationships should be forged with agencies that do.  In Austin, the Hazardous 
Materials unit of the Austin Fire Department keeps and maintains all air-monitoring 
equipment.  The Haz-Mat unit responds to all CLRT call-outs to assist with rescue, fire 
suppression, air-monitoring and, substance identification.  
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Reports of property damage and injuries to citizens from clandestine laboratories 
have been steadily increasing in Austin, TX.  In 2003, a luxury hotel sustained fire and 
explosion damage along with chemical contamination to two rooms being used in the 
production of methamphetamine.  Also in Austin, numerous residences have been 
condemned due to chemical contamination.  In one instance, because of the extreme 
clutter, the side of the house had to be cut out in order to access the laboratory 
apparatus.       
  Procurement of standardized equipment is consistently a problem from agency 
to agency. Even though one agency has a dedicated budget for lab mitigation and use 
state of the art SCBA systems and Level A protective suits, another agency in a 
neighboring jurisdiction is using dust masks and latex gloves purchased from a home 
improvement store.   
The inconsistency in various agencies ability to respond is clearly defined by the 
questionnaire results.  The majority of respondents to the questionnaire indicated their 
department assigns personnel to task-forces who respond to methamphetamine labs in 
their particular county or multi-county area.  However, these same respondents, who 
are persons of rank and have decision making status, did not know what kind, if any, 
training their officers receive or what kind of protective equipment is used.  The bulk of 
the survey’s questions were aimed at determining each agency’s level of supervision 
and training, types of safety equipment utilized and adherence to federal regulations.  
Since most questions were answered with “no” or “unknown”, the conclusion the 
researcher drew from the survey determined that the respondents were ignorant of what 
their personnel were doing with regards to clandestine laboratories.  In the event of an 
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employee injury or death, this level of ignorance could lead to a significant and 
embarrassing law-suit settlement. 
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS 
 Law enforcement officers who respond to illicit drug laboratories tend to be ill 
prepared for the threats posed by the differing hazardous materials and toxic conditions 
encountered at lab sites.  Should a law enforcement agency have a formalized 
clandestine laboratory coordinator position to ensure consistent levels of training and 
administration?  The lack of coordination with procuring standardized equipment and 
training and the absence of standard operating procedures with regard to clan lab 
response can elevate an agency’s exposure to civil liability from both injured employees 
and citizens.  Inadequate medical evaluations can expose a department to liability if an 
employee is tasked with a job they are unfit to perform.  By appointing one person to 
oversee the administration of health and safety evaluations, training and procurement of 
standardized equipment, an agency’s exposure to liability might be greatly reduced. 
As the researcher found through the review of literature and questionnaire, there 
are vast gaps in what most agency’s upper management team knows about how their 
personnel are being trained, protected and deployed to combat clandestine laboratories.  
There are variations in how police agencies are responding to the ever increasing 
numbers of seized clandestine drug laboratories.  Very few agencies have their own 
team.  Most jurisdictions rely on joint task-forces while the remainder utilizes the Texas 
Department of Public Safety (DPS) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to 
handle discovered labs.  It is because of this, the author concludes that the research 
does “in-part” support the assertion that an agency should have a full-time person 
14 
dedicated to coordinating the department’s response to illicit drug labs.  The caveat to 
this is that each department would not need to have their own coordinator.  A full-time 
coordinator is still needed for every team or task-force that responds to illicit labs.  
Unfortunately, what was discovered was an unnerving trend where managers really did 
not know what their employees were doing while assigned to joint task-forces.  It is at 
this point in the chain-of-command; the supervisor should be well-versed in their 
employee’s health, training and access to appropriate protective equipment.  If a 
department ignores this, the risk to police employees and the citizenry at-large is quite 
apparent.  As stated by Hargreaves (2000), “Raiding a clandestine drug laboratory has 
become one of the most dangerous operations a law enforcement officer can 
undertake”.  Among the limitations hindering this study was a shortage of literature 
addressing the need for a standardized response protocol.  The general consensus is to 
leave the training up to the Drug Enforcement Administration.  However, without 
consistent follow-up training and re-certification, bad habits will prevail.  I will conclude 
by again quoting Hargreaves (2000) as it cuts to the heart of this matter, “Police officers 
receive comprehensive training in many areas of law enforcement.  However, very few 
officers have expertise in firefighting, chemistry, bomb handling techniques, and 
hazardous waste disposal.  Unfortunately, illegal drug laboratories pose deadly threats 
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